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Effective Transition From Hostilities to Military Government
in Iraq:
Lessons Learned in Post-War Austria Applied

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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3 February 2003

"This is a fine mess. You are an American. Would something like this be possible in your country? These people are acting like burglars. One thing is for sure: I imagined the occupation was going to be completely different."¹

- *Viennese Landlord (Hedwig Bleibtreu) to Holly Martins (Joseph Cotton) after the Allied Military Police ransack Harry Lime's (Orson Welles) girl-friend's apartment and arrest her.*

¹ Graham Greene, screenplay, trans. by author, *The Third Man*, (London: British Lion Film Corp., 1949). Original quotation: "Schöne Geschichte. Sie sind Amerikaner. Ware so etwas in ihrem Lande möglich? Die Leute benehmen sich ja wie die Einbrecher. Eines ist sicher. Die Befreiung habe ich mir ganz anders vorgestellt."

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As the U.S. military stands at the brink of a second war with Iraq, the words of Carl von Clausewitz have never rung truer. "No one starts a war – or rather, no one in his senses ought to – without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it."¹ The President of the United States (U.S.) has done this by identifying the Desired End State (DES) to be a free and democratic Iraq.² Furthermore, he has announced that a military government is the only viable organization, which can achieve the preconditions of stability required for the DES.³

Many obstacles stand in Iraq's way to becoming a democracy. A U.S. military victory in and of itself will not change a balkanized country of artificial borders and a legacy of an aggressive, dictatorial strongman. President G. W. Bush is investing the credibility of the U.S., the momentum of its War on Terror, the prestige of its armed forces, its influence in - and the relative stability of - the Middle East to democratize Iraq.⁴

Some have argued that the Strategic Center of Gravity (COG) of the War on Terror is al-Qa'ida's hatred for America and its values.⁵ If one accepts this argument, one will realize that more than just U.S. military combat power is required to strike "blow after blow" at the enemy's COG.⁶ The military government, through positive influence on Iraqi democratic development, can deal one of these blows by demonstrating that the U.S. not only has good intentions, but will also follow through and achieve them. A democratic Iraq could become the new model for the entire region to emulate, and this would significantly undermine al-Qa'ida's Strategic COG.

With so much riding on Iraqi democracy, it is paramount that the military government succeeds. What will be difficult, however, and what the U.S. military has

little recent experience in, is exactly this type of task: running a government of a country of 24 million inhabitants, split into three disparate groups, each with good reasons to hate the other two. The Herculean responsibility for this will be borne by the Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC).⁷

Thus, the transition from victory on the battlefield to success in military government will be a crucial test not only for the JFLCC but also for the President's entire Mid-East strategy. The proverbial 'you never get a second chance to make a first impression' captures the fleeting nature of this opportunity. If the transition does not go well, momentum of victory will be lost and members of the United Nations Security Council, as well as Arab countries, will quickly criticize the entire concept in the media. One senses that the Clausewitzian dictum: only by "daring all to win all, will one really defeat the enemy," is viscerally understood and accepted by a President who is comfortable with a high degree of risk.⁸

In order to determine how to effect this transition best, it is worth looking into the U.S. military's past for success in similar circumstances. A close inspection of the U.S. occupation of Austria yields germane lessons for the coming situation in Iraq. Before the lessons learned half a century ago in Austria are applied to Iraq, the remarkable parallels between the two countries will be examined. These similarities will demonstrate that on several important levels, the Austrian situation after World War II is comparable to an Iraqi situation after a second Gulf War. In fact, of all possible past transitions to military government, the Austrian situation is the most analogous to Iraq. In Germany resistance was much stiffer and the occupying forces were directed to treat the population as conquered subjects.⁹ In the Pacific, the employment of the atomic bomb against Japan,

the vast areas to be governed, and the personality of General MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, made the military occupations of Japan and Pacific Islands a case unto itself.¹⁰ This leaves the Austrian situation, which best approaches what the military government will face in Iraq.

Once this basis for comparison has been established, an analysis of two successful transition techniques employed in Austria will be applied to Iraq followed by recommendations on implementation. The vital shift from the hostilities phase to the government phase in Iraq can be achieved smoothly, if the Joint Force Commander applies several updated methods of WWII Civil-Military Operations.

The reasons lessons learned in Austria can be applied to Iraq are plentiful. The two countries and their histories have more in common than one would at first think. The parallels are striking: periods of greatness followed by decline, little experience in democracy, socialist world perspective, educational levels, and external influences.

Austria's era of preeminence came to fruition during the Holy Roman Empire. After Maximilian I took the throne as the Holy Roman Emperor in 1493, the position became hereditary within the Habsburg dynasty. Austrian power grew following the election of Charles V in 1519 and ebbed during the Thirty Years War only to rebound again at the end of the sixteenth century, when the Peace of Carlowitz confirmed Austrian control of Hungary.¹¹ While the Napoleonic Wars displaced Austria from her political position, some power was regained through diplomacy at the Congress of Vienna. The Nineteenth Century Wars of German Unification further diminished Austria's prestige. The empire came to an end in the Treaty of Versailles after World War I. While its

European dominance waxed and waned, Austria remained “the major political entity in Central Europe” and exerted its influence as first among equals for over 500 years.¹²

This is approximately the same length of time that the Abbasid Caliphate ruled over the height of its empire. In the years 750-1258, Islamic warriors expanded the empire through conquest from Norbonne, France along the southern Mediterranean shores all the way up to Antioch across Mesopotamia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, all of Arabia and Persia up to the borders of Punjab. The seat of the Abbasid Caliphate was in Baghdad, and, for a time, the empire flourished in a peaceful coexistence with “other monotheistic religions with written scripture,” meaning Christians and Jews.¹³

This era was also marked by “one of the most glorious flowerings of Islamic civilizations,” which produced “many of its finest poets, scientists, philosophers, and jurists.”¹⁴ The tales of *The Thousand and One Nights* were written during this time, as were translations of Aristotle, Plato, and Hypocrites into Arabic. The basis for modern mathematics: algebra, algorithm, geometry was established along with astronomy.¹⁵

The period came to an end after a series of weak caliphs allowed their power to be usurped by their Mameluks. The crises of the Crusades and the Mongol invasion caused the final collapse. Competing caliphates established themselves in Cairo and Cordoba.¹⁶

The Austrian world of the arts and thus the European, too, developed likewise under the Habsburg dynasties. Austrian music, painting, medicine, and literature advanced to great heights. In the 19th Century, Vienna was the cultural capital of the world. These periods of grandeur profoundly affect the Austrians and the Iraqis in similar ways. Both are rightfully proud of their histories of political and artistic leadership and continue to celebrate the remaining symbols of them. For example, Salzburg holds over

4000 music and theater events annually, of which the Mozart Festival and the Salzburger Festspiele have gained worldwide recognition.¹⁷ Iraqis revere their ancient mosques, some of which date back to the seventh century, as well as their historical links to the cradle of all civilization: Ur and Babylon.¹⁸ In part, the remaining cultural legacies have allowed both societies to collectively compensate for the loss of world political power. The superior artistic legacies bestow a mantle of high culture on every subsequent generation and allow each society to perpetuate their own claims to superiority through artistic appreciation and sensitivity.

Conversely, neither country has had much experience with democracy. Even before Saddam Hussein seized power in 1979, a tradition of dictatorship followed one of monarchy. "In the decade between the 1958 revolution which ended the monarchy and the July 30, 1968 coup, which brought the Baath party to power, Iraq experienced four successful coups and a dozen abortive ones."¹⁹ The military blocked development of any political opposition by playing the key role in selecting national leadership but also through political repression and violent purges.²⁰ Even the Baath party, formerly a political party advocating "a secular outlook based on a theory of Arab unity and nationalism and a vogue mix of economic and social justice," has been turned into Saddam Hussein's rubber stamp by replacing the intellectuals with tribal and family loyalists.²¹

An analogous situation existed in Austria before the Allied occupation. The country had been a monarchy for ages. "Democratic traditions had developed only weakly, only to be broken off by 1933/4."²² Freedom of the press effectively ended at that time. Journalists and politicians, who were socialists, liberals, or Jews and advocates

for an independent Austria were progressively exiled, imprisoned or killed in concentration camps. After Anschluß in 1938, Austria became part of Germany and thus part of Adolf Hitler's Third Reich.

These comparative anti-democratic pasts also result in similar obstacles to any democratic reeducation efforts led by U.S. occupation forces. The actual extent and depth of Nazi party penetration into Austrian society was a mystery to the American occupying force just as the Baath's party will be to a future U.S. military government.²³ The Puritan-like de-nazification policy in Austria failed to discriminate between the wheat and the chaff. Many Austrian doctors, lawyers, teachers, government professionals had joined the Nazi party. They all had to be removed from their positions regardless of whether they had joined for promotion, social mobility, pressure, or actual belief. Since professionals like these had completed extensive training and had developed considerable field experience, they could not be immediately replaced. The result: the de-nazification policy significantly reduced efficiency in an already war-torn country.²⁴ The chance to repeat this mistake will come in Iraq.

Fortunately, a policy concerning this issue has already been declared: only top Baath party officials can expect to be removed. Those in leadership positions, who obey any of Saddam Hussein's illegal orders, the release of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) for instance, can expect to be prosecuted as war criminals. Lower to mid-ranking officials and officers, who are also party members, can expect to remain in their positions.²⁵ However, circumstances involving Baath party members and war crimes provoking a media outcry against all Baathists, can easily be imagined. It can, therefore, be safely stated that this type of policy decision could be subject to change with the

prevailing political winds. Neither Baath nor Nazi party membership is compatible with a U.S. military government.

Another source of commonality between Austria and Iraq is the predominantly socialist outlook their populations have on life. Iraqis seem to prefer a fair distribution of wealth across the population.²⁶ Despite Saddam Hussein's propensity for building multi-million dollar palaces and mosques during food shortages, the socialist outlook will remain.²⁷ The historical Bedouin hospitality tradition of protecting guests and sharing whatever is available with them has only been intensified during the embargo years. Tribes and families have had to share to survive.

While the socialist Weltanschauung in Austria has different historical roots, the general attitude is similar. Along with most of Western Europe, the socialist political party has long enjoyed widespread popularity in Austria. Usually finishing with an absolute or relative majority in national elections, the Socialist Party of Austria (SPÖ) has built its success on articulating the population's Weltanschauung. The SPÖ planks of "freedom, equality, justice and solidarity" are built on putting "people ahead of markets" with union and family friendly policies to ensure "fairness in the workplace" and "social justice" in society.²⁸

A qualifier of the socialist outlook is the general education level of both countries. Education used to be a high priority in Iraq. From 1968 to 1978, attendance in primary school rose 101% and in secondary school 132.5%. Even more impressive for an Arabic state, the corresponding percentages for females rose 156% and 178%.²⁹ Sadly, much of the Western modeled school system supporting 22 universities has atrophied under Saddam Hussein.³⁰ Nevertheless, there still remains the group of professionals, who

grew up under the old system, some even educated in Great Britain or the U.S. They are “generally secular and culturally western” and “likely to be energetic, well disciplined, and competent managers and professionals.”³¹

The educational situation in Austria at the end of WWII has certain parallels to the current Iraqi situation. The Austrian school system was a highly professional organization, albeit for men only. Attempted all-girl schools were replaced by integrated schools with segregated classrooms and curricula. After Anschluß in 1938, the Nazis purged the schools of “political unreliaables” as well as all Jewish teachers and students.³² Closing all Catholic schools and eliminating the entrance examinations for scientific centers of higher learning further undermined education. The Nazis dealt school integration a fatal blow by strictly imposing a separate female curriculum to prepare girls for motherhood.³³

In addition to the internal parallels of history, culture, outlook, and education, both countries also have several analogous external influences, which will affect military government. In Austria, the U.S. and her allies competed with the Soviet Union and each other for influence. Austria, bordered on the western edge of the Iron Curtain, was an important ideological battleground for both sides in a nascent Cold War. The Soviets had strong interests in Austrian manufacturing and intellectual property. They sought to exact war reparations in both areas in the form of factory dismantlement and outright kidnapping.³⁴ The French occupation forces, motivated by revenge and a sense of entitlement, earned their sobriquet “Russians in perfume” in their pursuit of similar policies.³⁵

Coincidentally, it is both Russia and France, who have strong interests in Iraq. The French oil business had received contracts to Iraqi oil in the United Nations' Food For Oil program. Iraq is a former Soviet client state and still owes great sums for arms imports. Both countries view the U.S. DES as a threat, since they fear a more U.S. oriented Iraq will displace them. Iraq's neighbors, Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, also view the U.S. DES as a threat, but for different reasons. Turkey, Syria, and Iran apprehensively view any greater Kurdish emancipation in Iraq, since this could cause unrest in their Kurdish minority populations. Iran also distrusts the 14 million Iraqi Shiites, who with a greater political freedom are unlikely to desire an Islamic republic on the model of Iran. A secular democratic Iraq, in which a Shiite majority can thrive, will be a grave challenge to the neighboring Shiite state ruled by a religious cleric with unchecked power.³⁶ Lastly, Syria and Saudi Arabia fear that a democratic Arabic state next door would prove to be unsettling to its own population. All neighboring states realize that a viable, progressive government model in a democratic Iraq would shake up entire Arab world.³⁷

In the Moscow Declaration of 1943, the Allies agreed to treat the Austrians as a liberated people.³⁸ In a similar policy, the White House has repeatedly declared that the war will be against Saddam Hussein and his supporters and not the Iraqi people. This is an important distinction, since it implies that the war will liberate the Iraqi people from Saddam Hussein. Thus, the relationship between the occupying force and the people has the same basis in Iraq as it did in Austria. The ultimate goal of the occupations is the same in both cases: wooing the people to the Western way of life and away from totalitarianism, Communist or Baathist.

In is this wooing process, which is at the heart of the DES, the U.S. military government will have to pro-actively create the preconditions for a peaceful democracy. It is doubtful that the Iraqis can be persuaded to transition to a peaceful democracy, unless they perceive this to be in their own self-interest. If they perceive it to be only in the interest of the U.S., they will be against it.

Clearly, the transition to the military government will be an uphill battle against Iraqi preconception. One should not forget that from the Iraqi perspective the military government will appear confusingly dichotomous. "Transitional and educational as its character may be, military government is by force of necessity an undemocratic regime."³⁹ In order to preempt the Iraqis from proclaiming: "*We knew it – The U.S. does not want democracy, it only wants control!*" the Joint Force Commander (JFC) will need to get the American side of the story out during, if not before, the transition to military government.

The best way to accomplish this was pioneered by General Harry Collins, 42nd Infantry Division Commander and later Military Governor of the *Land* Salzburg. He personally visited the towns in his area and instructed the officers in charge to establish local newspapers.⁴⁰ The idea was to reestablish Austrian familiarity with a free press but also to give them a stake in the process. It caught on quickly and was soon implemented on a large scale. Members of the Information Services Branch (ISB) started newspapers with Austrian support staffs.⁴¹ In this way, the ISB staff ensured the removal of all Nazis from the Austrian press corps and at the same time organized "the entire press system according to U.S. model."⁴² This technique proved to be very effective in the long run. "The influence of U.S. culture officers on the Austrian media was immense. A new kind

of boulevard journalism was introduced in the *Wiener Kurier* that was frequently imitated. Furthermore, many of today's most prominent Austrian journalists were trained by experienced U.S. colleagues."⁴³

The potential of this idea for Iraq is noteworthy. The education levels in society support the concept. It would give Iraqis their first chance at a free press with U.S. technical assistance. With modern information technology (IT) it could be even easier to implement than in Austria. The U.S. forces will be bringing much IT equipment into Iraqi. A fraction of it should be earmarked for this Iraqi newspaper project. The investment will reap huge dividends by establishing the foundations for local newspapers and an experience with free press, which will go far to counter Saddam Hussein's propaganda and dismantle Iraqi preconceptions about an U.S. military government. It will also allow the Iraqis to participate in the transition process. The trenchant analogy of Larry Summers, President of Harvard University: "*In the history of the world, no one has ever washed a rented car*" captures the realization that "until the Arab peoples are given a real ownership stake in their countries – a real voice in how they are run – they will never wash them, never improve them as they should."⁴⁴

The next step in the process will be to get Iraqi towns to publish their newspapers online. While the infrastructure cannot support it yet, plans can be drafted to get each Iraqi town connected.⁴⁵ Since the café plays a prominent role in the social structure of the Iraqi town, it is the ideal location to set up the first Internet station. People already congregate there for several hours a day to relax, drink lemon tea, watch soccer, and discuss the news and politics. After an Internet hook-up in each café, Iraqis will be able

to get the latest news directly from local or international sources in a forum for lively discussion.⁴⁶

Furthermore, once free Iraqi newspapers are available on the web, the entire Arab world will be able to follow the progress of the military government from a positive Iraqi perspective. This will preempt the criticism of American media being a check valve through which it attains "cultural imperialism."⁴⁷ The Iraqi voice expressed in the online newspapers will be an Arab perspective projected through a U.S. channel.

The most effective guarantee of the success of this media is actual follow-through by Civil-Military Operations.⁴⁸ The media's message: *the U.S. military government is fostering democracy in Iraq*, is best realized by rapidly promoting new government at the local level. This was successfully done in Austria, too. For instance, when Lieutenant (LT) Walter Hagen, 101st Airborne Division, arrived in Zell am See on 8 May 1945, Dr. Erich Schandlbauer met him at the main hotel of the town. LT Hagen was informed by the Austrian that he had been chosen the night before as the interim mayor. The American officer accepted this and then instructed the new interim mayor to rid his government of all Nazis.⁴⁹ Supported by the official U.S. approval, Dr. Schandlbauer "and the other Austrians who considered themselves members of the war-time resistance movement selected their city council. It met a week later. Subsequently, the group labored seven days a week in the early occupation to restore order and reinstate a viable economy and Austrian political rule."⁵⁰ The officers of the 101st Airborne engaged Schandlbauer and the other new mayors of the area with an offer of assistance conditioned upon the caveat that the Austrians "must work for themselves night and day to achieve recovery."⁵¹

And so it will have to be in Iraq. In an interview with the German newspaper, *Die Zeit*, Ms. Condoleezza Rice explained that as a matter of policy the foundations have to be set for the Iraqis to accept responsibility for their own destiny within a democratic framework.⁵² The quickest way to lay this foundation will be for U.S. forces to encourage, assist, and work with de-Baathified local governments. This interaction will be strengthening for a budding democracy but it will also greatly ease the U.S. forces' burden of government; a concept implemented early in World War II. "Most of the military government officers in the field [Austria] had learned by bitter experience in Italy that the only way to administer affairs was through indigenous governments."⁵³ This lesson learned was applied and validated in Austria.

It would be prudent to reapply it to Iraq, where millions of refugees, considerable combat damages, and food shortages could be just the first crises facing a military government. In accordance with Article 64 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians Persons in Time of War, the U.S. will bear the responsibility for remedying these problems.⁵⁴ Nevertheless, as a matter of efficiency, the military government can still delegate the actions required to solve these problems to local governments. In Austria, for instance, there were thousands of displaced people and prisoners of war, who had to be taken care of, along with food shortages. "Most of the provincial supply officers had learned from hard experience in Italy the desirability of turning foodstuffs over immediately to local authorities, thus avoiding the accounting and guarding responsibilities."⁵⁵ The same can be accomplished through local governments in Iraq.

Moreover, three distinct groups in Iraq: Kurds, Tribesmen, mid-level professionals, can be leveraged in the initial local governments. First, the four million Kurds living under the umbrella of the Northern No-Fly Zone in Iraq "have been living an experiment in self-rule since an uprising against Saddam Hussein."⁵⁶ Their elected leadership has proven it can successfully administer large-scale projects like security and defense but also technical ones like airstrip preparation for U.S. transport aircraft.⁵⁷ Even more important, the Kurdish leadership has come to the realization that an independent Kurdish state is not possible in the short run and maturely embraced "the idea of incorporating Kurds into a democratic, federal Iraq."⁵⁸

The second group U.S. forces can turn to for local government is the tribes. The 150 tribes already have their own organization, which reaches down to over 2000 clans. The largest tribes are over a million strong and even the smallest have a few thousand. They are also armed, so if the U.S. fails to engage them in local government, it could be faced with engaging them in guerrilla warfare.⁵⁹

Saddam Hussein has recognized this group's importance and has implemented a concerted carrot and stick approach to keep it on his side. For carrots, the tribes have received "cash, cars, arms, schools and other bounty to ensure their loyalty."⁶⁰ An example of the concomitant stick tactic came in October 2002. Tribal leaders were ordered to Baghdad, where they were made to "swear not to allow a repeat of the 1991 rebellion" with a Koran between their hands.⁶¹ Tribal leaders and anyone else, who is suspected of harboring an anti-Saddam attitude, have disappeared.⁶²

Even so, the U.S. expects that tribes can be won over, as they were in Afghanistan. The tribes respect a powerful winner. A strong U.S. military show of force

in defeating the Iraqi armed forces will be a harbinger of which way the wind will blow. Both the U.S. and the Saudi intelligence agencies have been meeting with tribal relatives outside Iraq and the latter has begun making cash payments to sway the tribes.⁶³ More importantly, if the tribal leaders perceive a role for themselves in the transition, they will be more likely to greet the U.S. as guests rather than invaders. The tribes are usually tied to certain areas by tradition. Their leadership in society has reemerged significantly, since the Gulf War created a power vacuum in the No-Fly Zones. Tribal leaders will have certain expectations of power and respect, which will need to be met in the transition phase to ensure they can be employed as surrogate local governments.

The third group to be leveraged for local government is the professional class. Individuals, who have college degrees and experience in administration, will naturally fit into local governments. Identified by Condoleezza Rice as the “building blocks” of an “efficient bureaucracy,” this group will be the nexus for establishing order and services in the metropolitan areas.⁶⁴

It is recommended that the realization of both ideas fall to the Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF). In fact, one has already been established at Central Command headquarters for Operation Enduring Freedom. Within the JCMOTF, the Psychological Operation (PYSOP) cell would be responsible for devising the implementation of both ideas, since PSYOP objectives include: “...further U.S. and/or multi-national efforts by modifying or influencing attitudes and behaviors of selected audiences; counter hostile propaganda...”⁶⁵

The Iraqi newspaper project fits neatly into U.S. Joint Military Doctrine: “an informed populace is fostered through news media, public discussion and the formation

of political parties.”⁶⁶ Two of the three prerequisites can be accomplished by this method. The PSYOP cell can plan where to establish newspapers, choose PSYOP units to lead each project, direct the equipment flow in support, and coordinate the future connectivity for online publishing.

In the local government initiative, the three identified groups can be engaged civically before U.S. forces come into contact with them. PSYOPs techniques can be utilized to notify them ahead of time to encourage self-organization and self-discipline to prevent looting and reprisals. The initial messages can be followed with guidance to the local governments on where to direct refugees, when food drops could be expected and what to do with Saddam Hussein loyalists. The leitmotiv of: “*U.S. forces are arriving to establish the foundation for Iraqi democracy*” must be driven home in all PSYOP messages.

Some might argue both ideas are doomed from the start, because the lessons learned in Austria could never be applied to Iraq. Europeans and Arabs are just too different for the concepts to be transferable. U.S. personnel in Austria at least had a common European heritage on which to base their interactions. The U.S. military personnel practice a completely different religion and culture than Iraq’s inhabitants.

In fact, research has shown that very few of the occupation force in Austria spoke German. U.S. troops certainly would not have been considered cosmopolitan by any stretch of the imagination. Austrians found them uncultured and complained about them frequently.⁶⁷ Moreover, a common historical heritage is also practically non-existent. Fearing a labor and brain drain, the Habsburg monarchs consistently forbade their subjects to emigrate to the New World.⁶⁸ Yet despite the cultural prejudices and lack of

heritage, the occupation was a success, since “most of the men had the average American’s adaptability and tolerance of other races – qualities which made for cooperative effort and internationalism of outlook.”⁶⁹ These qualities are still inherent in U.S. troops today and will see them through in Iraq, just like they did in Austria.

In conclusion, Professor Reinhold Wagnleitner has found in his study of the U.S. occupation of Austria that “democratization concentrated on reorganizing institutions rather than encouraging a change in social relations. It may be doubted, however, whether an alteration of consciousness can ever be achieved without a change in social relationships.”⁷⁰ It should be clear that without a new government, the social relationships between the Kurds, Shia, and Sunni will never change. Only a military government can shield Iraq from external pressure and prevent internal violence to create an environment in which these divergent groups can peacefully reach a consensus on their future course towards democracy.

However, it will be another matter to convince these groups that this will be in their best interest. Therefore, the transition to military government will be crucial in setting the tone and the preconditions for the military government’s success. The two best ways to start a transition, which will garner support, entail giving them a stake in the process. The newspaper project and the local government initiative were success stories for the U.S. military government of Austria. It would be a fitting legacy for modernized Arab versions of these ideas to smooth the path to military government in Iraq, which in turn would lead to a peaceful, democratic country.

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¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996), 700.

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³ Peter Slevin and Bradley Graham, "U.S. Plans Interim Military Rule in Postwar Iraq", *Washington Post*, 17 January 2003, 15(A).

⁴ "The War After Iraq," STRATFOR, 11 December 2002; available from <http://www.stratfor.com/corp>; Internet; accessed 12 December 2002, p. 5 of 6.

⁵ Antulio J. Echevarria II, "Clausewitz's Center of Gravity: It's Not What We Thought", *Naval War College Review* 56 (Winter 2003), 118.

⁶ Clausewitz, *On War*, 720.

⁷ Slevin, "Military Rule in Postwar Iraq". Post-War plans call for the military ground commander to be the head of the military government. LTG McKiernan is identified as the commander of the U.S. ground forces.

⁸ Clausewitz, *On War*, 720. In the first half of his Presidency, George W. Bush has taken a high degree of risk in the pursuit of his goals; notably: the first tax break, invasion of Afghanistan, staking his political capital on Republican Candidates during the 2002 election. Bill Keller in "The Radical Presidency of George W. Bush" *New York Times Sunday Magazine* (26 Jan 2003) suggests that this comfort with risk comes from working in the oil business and not wanting to repeat the mistakes of his father.

⁹ Carlos D'Este, *Eisenhower: A Soldier's Life*, (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2002), 588-650.

¹⁰ Arthur D. Bouterse, Philip H. Taylor, and Arthur A. Maass, *American Experiences in Military Government*, 319-328.

¹¹ Richard Overy, ed., *The Times History of the World New Edition*, (London: Times Books, 1999), 191-196.

¹² Robert Wilde, "The Habsburg States," *The History Net*; available from <http://europeanhistoy.about.com/cs/habsburgstates>; Internet; accessed 20 January 2003, p. 1 of 3.

¹³ Overy, *History of the World*, 99.

¹⁴ Richard F. Nyrop, ed., *Iraq-A Country Study*, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), 4. This edition was printed prior to Saddam Hussein seizing power himself and thus provides an interesting pre-Saddam Hussein perspective on Iraq.

¹⁵ Geoff Simons, *Iraq: From Sumer To Saddam*, (New York: St Martin's Press 1996), 154-157.

¹⁶ Overy, *History of the World*, 98.

- ¹⁷ "Veranstaltungen", *Salzburg: Die Buhne Der Welt*, available from http://www.salzburginfo.or.at/veranstaltungen_390.htm; Internet; accessed 20 January 2003, p.1 of 1.
- ¹⁸ Simons, *Sumer to Saddam*, 113-122.
- ¹⁹ Judith S. Yaphe, "Iraq Before and After Saddam," *Current History* 102 (January 2003), 8.
- ²⁰ Nyrop, *Iraq-A Country Study*, 6.
- ²¹ Yaphe, "Iraq Before and After," 9.
- ²² Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War*, trans. Diana M. Wolf, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 87.
- ²³ George C. S. Benson, *American Experiences in Military Government in World War II*, ed. Carl J. Friedrich, (New York: Rinehart Company, 1948), 178.
- ²⁴ Ibid.
- ²⁵ Sanger and Dao, "US Plan to Democratic Iraq", 10(A).
- ²⁶ Nyrop, *Iraq - A Country Stud*, 7.
- ²⁷ John F. Burns, "Hussein's Obsession: An Empire of Mosques", *New York Times*, 15 December 2002, 1(A).
- ²⁸ SPOe, trans by author, Party Program, available from http://www.spoe.at/index_basis1.htm; Internet; accessed 21 January 2003, p. 4 of 31.
- ²⁹ Iraq – A Country Study, 108.
- ³⁰ Yaphe, "Before and After Saddam", 7.
- ³¹ Phebe Marr, "Iraq: 'The Day After', *Naval War College Review* 56 (Winter 2003), 22.
- ³² "Historical Timeline", trans by author, Austrian Department of Education, Science and Culture, available from <http://www.bmbwk.gv.at/start.asp?isllink=1&bereich=3&I1=15&I2=25&I3=141&OID=2010#>; Internet; accessed 22 January 2003, p. 5 of 8.
- ³³ Ibid.
- ³⁴ Bauer, Robert A. ed, *The Austrian Solution: International Conflict and Cooperation*, (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1982), 15-30.
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- ³⁶ "Neighbors from Hell," *The Economist*, 14 December 2002, 38-40.
- ³⁷ Thomas Friedman, "Thinking About Iraq (I)," *New York Times*, 22 January 2003, 23 (A).

- ³⁸ Donald R. Whitnah and Florentine E. Whitnah, *Salzburg Under Siege: U.S. Occupation 1945-1955*, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 90.
- ³⁹ Robert G. Neumann, *American Experiences in Military Government*, 57.
- ⁴⁰ The German expression *Land* has no fitting equivalent in English. A *Land* is larger than a county but not as autonomous as a state in the U.S. Whitnah, *Salzburg*, 37.
- ⁴¹ Benson, *American Experiences in Military Government*, 185.
- ⁴² Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization*, 84.
- ⁴³ *Ibid.*, 276.
- ⁴⁴ Friedman quotes Harvard President Lawrence Summers' car wash analogy in "Thinking About Iraq (I)," 23(A).
- ⁴⁵ "Iraq", CIA World Fact Book, 2001, available from <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geo/iz/htm.people>; Internet; accessed 20 January 2003.
- ⁴⁶ Michael Mallory, interview by author, notecard, Newport, Ri., 23 January 2003.
- ⁴⁷ Wagnleitner argues in *Coca-Colonization* that the U.S. media is an asymmetric system which only projects U.S. culture to the world and never receives, despite the claim that it fosters an exchange.
- ⁴⁸ U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Military Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 2001), II-10.
- ⁴⁹ Whitnah, *Salzburg*, 27.
- ⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 28.
- ⁵¹ *Ibid.*
- ⁵² Condolezza Rice, interview by Josef Joffe, trans. by author, *Die Zeit* (12 December 2002), 3.
- ⁵³ Benson, *American Experiences in Military Government*, 187.
- ⁵⁴ Joint Forces Command, *Civil-Military Operations*, II-4.
- ⁵⁵ Benson, *American Experiences in Military Government*, 193.
- ⁵⁶ C.J. Chivers, "Dreams of a Kurdish State Die Down, at Least for Now", *New York Times*, 22 January 2003, 1(A).
- ⁵⁷ C.J. Chivers, "U.S. Team Visits Airstrip Repaired by Kurds, Fueling Talk of War", *New York Times*, 22 January 2003, 12(A).
- ⁵⁸ Chivers, "Dreams of a Kurdish State", 8(A).
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⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

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⁶⁴ Rice, interview, 3.

⁶⁵ Joint Forces Command, *Civil-Military Operations*, II-7.

⁶⁶ Ibid., I-18.

⁶⁷ Benson, *American Experiences in Military Government*, 172.

⁶⁸ Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization*, 36.

⁶⁹ Benson, *American Experiences in Military Government*, 172.

⁷⁰ Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization*, 67.